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I.

INTRODUCTION

The present action was filed four years ago after PlaintiffParkWest Homes LLC
("ParkWest") was stiffed for much of what Defendant Julie G. Barnson ("Bamson") owed
ParkWest for constructing a single-family residence on a lot in Canyon County (the "Property").
This is ParkWest's second appeal of an adverse summary judgment voiding its lien in the
Property.
The first appeal was filed shortly after judgment had been entered in ParkWest's
favor against Bamson (the "Bamson Judgment"), when the district court granted the nominee for
Bamson's mortgage lender, Defendant Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
("MERS"), summary judgment voiding ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien. ParkWest then
appealed MERS' judgment to the Supreme Court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the
case after holding:
We hold that the claim of lien substantially complied with Idaho
Code § 45-507 and that the lien was valid for labor and materials
supplied after the contractor registered.

*

*

*

Thus, ParkWest is entitled to a lien for work or labor it provided
and materials it supplied during the time that it was duly registered.

ParkWest Homes LLCv. Barnson, 149 Idaho 603, 604 & 608, 238 P.3d 203, 204 & 208 (2010)
[hereinafter "Barnson f'].
While the first appeal in this lawsuit was pending, MERS caused the Property to
be conveyed by trustee's sale to Defendant/Intervenor Residential Funding Real Estate Holdings,
LLC ("Residential"). Residential intervened in this case following the remand by Barnson I and
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then filed its own summary judgment motion challenging the validity of ParkWest's claimed
mechanic's lien in the Property, which motion was also granted. However, the district court's
judgment for Residential is based on the following erroneous grounds:
•

The lis pendens and Bamson Judgment that ParkWest recorded against the

Property failed to provide Residential with constructive notice of this civil action and ParkWest's
lien in the Property.
•

The priority of Park West's claimed mechanic's lien in the Property was

lost when the Bamson Judgment became a final judgment.
•

The "law ofthe case" doctrine did not preclude Residential from litigating

additional challenges to the validity of ParkWest's lien in the Property, notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's opinion in Barnson 1 holding the lien to be valid.
•

The interest in the Property acquired by Residential was held by the

trustee under MERS' deed of trust, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's precedent holding that
a deed of trust conveys to the trustee nothing more than legal title for purposes of the power of
sale.
Based on the points and authorities discussed below establishing the district
court's error on the foregoing grounds, the judgment in Residential's favor should be vacated
and the matter again remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

2
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II.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.
On November 28,2006, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder a

Claim of Lien and then mailed to Bamson by certified mail a copy of the recorded document.
Clerk's Record ("R"), Vol. 1, p. 96,

~

8 and pp. 103-05. Following the commencement of this

action, Bamson consented to the filing of Park West's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") in
the district court and the entry of the Bamson Judgment in ParkWest's favor. R, Vol. 1, pp. 8-9,
~~

1-2. Based on this stipulation, the SAC was filed and the district court then entered judgment

against Bamson to the extent of her interest in the Property for the amounts pleaded in the SAC.
R, First Appeal ("FA"), pp. 106-07. The Bamson Judgment was not appealed in the prior appeal
in this case nor ever contested by any of the parties in the proceedings before the district court.
Moreover, not only does the Bamson Judgment expressly state that it is "to be a final judgment
against Bamson," R, FA, p. 108,

~

4; but the judgment now on appeal states that the Bamson

Judgment "constitutes a final judgment ... ," R, Vol. 4, p. 509, ~ 5.
In addition to its Claim of Lien, ParkWest filed with the Canyon County Recorder
each of the following items to provide notice of this civil action and ParkWest's lien in the
Property: (i) on August 13,2007, ParkWest's Lis Pendens, which identifies ParkWest's claimed
lien and the defendants named in ParkWest's initial complaint, R, Vol. 3, p. 439; (ii) on
September 13,2007, ParkWest's Amended Lis Pendens, which identifies ParkWest's claimed
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lien and the defendants named in the SAC, R, Vol. 3, p. 441; and (iii) on October 9, 2008, the
Bamson Judgment, R, Vol. 4, p. 548. 1
Two years after ParkWest recorded its two lis pendens and a year after it recorded
the Bamson Judgment, Residential purchased the Property by trustee's sale held under MERS'
deed oftrust in July 2009. R, Vol. 3, p. 391. The fundamental dispute between ParkWest and
Residential is whether Residential acquired the Property at the trustee's sale - which was held
after the recorded Barnson Judgment became a final judgment under Idaho law - free of
ParkWest's lien or subject to it.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below.
The commencement of this lien-foreclosure action was stayed when Barnson filed

a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy on April 13,2007, through July 21,2007, when the
bankruptcy court granted ParkWest relief from the automatic stay. R, Vol. 1, pp. 96-97,

~

9.

ParkWest shortly thereafter filed its Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on August 7, 2007,
and, as a matter of course, filed its First Amended Verified Complaint to Foreclose Lien on
September 12,2007. R, Vol. 1, p. 1. As a result of Bamson's ongoing bankruptcy case,
however, all proceedings in this action were stayed by the district court's order entered
February 27,2008, through September 4,2008, when ParkWest filed a motion for leave to file its
SAC shortly after the dismissal of Barns on's bankruptcy case. Id. The SAC was filed on

1 The court is requested to take judicial notice of ParkWest's two recorded lis pendens
and the recorded Barnson Judgment, pursuant to Rule 201, Idaho Rules of Evidence.

4
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October 6,2008, pursuant to order of the district court. R, Vol. 1, p. 2. No answer was ever
filed in this action by Barnson to the initial or amended complaints filed by ParkWest.
MERS filed a motion for summary judgment on October 2, 2008, and judgment in
favor of MERS was thereafter entered on January 26, 2009 ("MERS' Judgment"). R, FA, pp. 31

& 134. ParkWest timely filed its Notice of Appeal with respect to MERS' Judgment on
March 9, 2009. R, FA, p. 137. At the conclusion ofthe first appeal in this case, the Supreme
Court vacated MERS' Judgment and remanded the case to the district court subj ect to the
opinion in Barnson 1, with the Remittitur being issued on July 19, 2010. R, Vol. 1, p. 93.
Following the remand by Barnson I, ParkWest filed a motion on August 12,2010,
for leave to file its Supplemental Amended Complaint to Foreclose Lien ("Supplemental
Complaint"), with MERS filing a notice of non-opposition to ParkWest's motion on
September 2,2010. R, Vol. 1, p. 3. The Supplemental Complaint was filed September 14,2010,
as allowed by order of the district court filed on the following day. Id. MERS filed its answer
on October 7, 2010. Id.
Counsel for MERS and Residential, on the one hand, and counsel for ParkWest,
on the other, agreed to Residential's intervention in this action pursuant to the terms of their
Stipulation to Intervene filed November 4,2010, with the district court entering its order in the
stipulated form to allow intervention on November 10,2010. R, Vol. 1, pp. 114 & 164.
Residential then filed its Answer and Counterclaim in Intervention on November 15, 2010,
R, Vol. 2, p. 299; and, on November 30,2010, ParkWest filed its Answer to Counterclaim in
Intervention, R, Vol. 3, p. 393.

5
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On November 12, 2010, MERS filed a motion to be dismissed, based on the fact
that it had held no interest in the Property since July 9,2009, when the Property was sold by
trustee's sale to Residential. R, Vol. 1, p. 4. Residential then filed its motion for summary
judgment on November 17,2010, based on its contention that ParkWest's claimed mechanic's
lien in the Property was void as to Residential. R, Vol. 3, p. 342. Both MERS' and Residential's
respective dispositive motions, among several others, were argued to the district court on
January 13,2011, with all pending motions being taken under advisement. R, Vol. 1, p. 6.
Thereafter, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on MERS' Motion for
Protective Order, ParkWest's Motion to Compel, MERS' Motion to Dismiss, Residential's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Residential's Motion in Limine ("Decision I") on
February 16,2011, granting both MERS' and Residential's dispositive motions. R, Vol. 4,
pp. 481 & 502.
ParkWest filed a motion for reconsideration ofthe district court's decision on
Residential's motion for summary judgment on February 23, 2011, based on the fact and legal
effect ofthe Barnson Judgment. R, Vol. 4, p. 504. However, the district court entered judgment
in favor of Residential and MERS (the "Judgment") on March 1,2011, before deciding
ParkWest's motion. R, Vol. 4, p. 508. Accordingly, on March 4,2011, ParkWest also filed a
motion to alter or amend the Judgment on the identical grounds raised in its pending motion for
reconsideration, in order to ensure the district court retained jurisdiction over the case until it
could rule on ParkWest's motion for reconsideration. R, Vol. 4, p. 511. Oral argument was held
on ParkWest's two pending motions on March 30,2011, which were both denied on June 14,
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2011, by the district court's Memorandum Decision and Order Denying ParkWest's Motion for
Reconsideration - and Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Decision II"). R, Vol. 4,
pp. 585-86 & 597.
In accordance with Rules II(a)(I) and 14(a), ParkWest timely filed its Notice of
Appeal with respect to the Judgment on June 21,2011. R, Vol. 4, p. 600.

C.

Statement of Facts.
1.

On or about March 15,2006, Barnson and ParkWest entered into a

contract (the "Contract") for ParkWest's construction on the Property of a single-family
residence for Barnson for the sum of$450,000. R, Vol. 1, p. 96, ~ 6.
2.

Although ParkWest was not registered as a contractor by the State of

Idaho when the Contract was executed, ParkWest (i) obtained its registration on May 2,2006,
(ii) obtained a building permit to construct the improvements to the Property on May 18, 2006,
and (iii) performed its first work in constructing the improvements to the Property on May 22,
2006. R, FA, p. 112, ~ 3.
3.

The Certificate of Occupancy for Bamson's residence was issued by

Canyon County on November 1, 2006. R, Vol. 1, p. 96, ~ 7 and p. 102.
4.

Shortly after the Barnson residence was substantially completed, Barnson

granted MERS a Deed of Trust on the Property to secure her home loan (the "MERS' Deed of
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Trust"), which was recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on November 14,2006. 2 R, Vol. 3,
p. 364, ~ 2 and p. 367.
5.

Based on Barnson's failure to pay ParkWest for much of the work it

performed in constructing her residence, ParkWest filed its Claim of Lien with the Canyon
County Recorder on November 28, 2006, and then mailed to Barnson by certified mail a
recorded copy on November 30,2006. R, Vol. 1, p. 96, ~ 8 and pp. 103-05.
6.

ParkWest also filed with the Canyon County Recorder (i) on August 13,

2007, ParkWest's Lis Pendens, which identifies ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien in the
Property and the defendants named in ParkWest's initial complaint, including Barnson and
MERS, R, Vol. 3, p. 439; and (ii) on September 13,2007, ParkWest's Amended Lis Pendens,
which identifies ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien in the Property and the defendants named
in the SAC, including Barnson and MERS, R, Vol. 3, p. 441.
7.

The Barnson Judgment was entered in this action against Barnson to the

extent of her interest in the Property on October 7, 2008, whereunder ParkWest was awarded
$141,208.39 for the amount it was owed for constructing Barnson's residence and $33,000.00 for
the costs of perfecting and enforcing Park West's lien, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees,
together with prejudgment interest at the stipulated rate. R, FA, pp. 106 & 107, ~ 2.

2 Barnson also granted MERS a trust deed to secure a "second" on the Property, which
was also recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on November 14,2006. The first recorded of
these two trust deeds, which was subsequently foreclosed by trustee's sale, is referred to as the
"MERS' Deed of Trust."
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8.

The Bamson Judgment, which not only specifies the amount of

ParkWest's judgment lien in the Property but also identifies both Bamson and MERS as party
defendants in this action, was recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on October 9, 2008.

R, Vol. 4, p. 548.
9.

Residential purchased the Property during the pendency of the first appeal

at a trustee's sale held under the MERS' Deed of Trust on or about July 9,2009, with the
Trustee's Deed being recorded by the Canyon County Recorder on July 20,2009. R, Vol. 3,
p. 364,

~

4 and p. 391-92.
10.

Although MERS' Judgment was based on only one of the grounds

asserted by MERS in its motion for summary judgment, MERS had asserted that ParkWest's
claimed mechanic's lien in the Property was "unenforceable and not prior in right to MERS'
Deeds of Trust" for three independent reasons: (i) because ParkWest's Claim of Lien was invalid

on its face and did not contain a sufficient verification, (ii) because ParkWest had not registered
as a contractor before it entered into the Contract, and (iii) because ParkWest failed to make
certain required disclosures to Bamson. R, FA, p. 32, ~~ 1-3 (emphasis added). Additionally,
MERS' Judgment both decreed that "the liens ofMERS' Deeds of Trust are, for all purposes,
prior and senior to ParkWest's mechanic's lien ... " and dismissed ParkWest's claim for relief.
R, FA, pp. 134-35, ~~ 1-2. As quoted above, however, the Supreme Court vacated MERS'
Judgment based on the holding that ParkWest's claimed lien in the Property was valid for labor
and materials supplied after ParkWest registered as a contractor. Barnson 1, supra.
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11.

Following the Supreme Court's remand to the district court, ParkWest

supplemented the alleged facts supporting its lien in the Property to incorporate the following
allegation regarding the Barnson Judgment, which had been entered after the SAC was filed and
became final when MERS' Judgment was entered:
Final judgment was entered in this action against Barnson
to the extent of her interest in the Property, but not personally,
pursuant to the terms of that certain Default Judgment Against
Julie G. Barnson Only, filed October 7, 2008, whereunder
ParkWest was awarded $141,208.39 for the amount owed to
ParkWest as of November 28,2006, with respect to its
construction of improvements to the Property; prejudgment interest
at the rate of$69.64 per diem from November 28,2006, through
October 7,2008, which totals $47,285.56 in interest; and
$33,000.00 for the costs of perfecting and enforcing ParkWest's
lien, costs of suit, and reasonable attorney fees.
R, Vol. 1, p. 97,

~

12.

11.
As with MERS' Judgment vacated by Barnson I, the Judgment now on

appeal also decrees that ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien in the Property is unenforceable
and not prior in right to the MERS' Deed of Trust. R, Vol. 4, p. 509,
13.

~'r

2-4.

In addition to challenging the validity of ParkWest's claimed mechanic's

lien in the Property on the grounds argued in Residential's motion for summary judgment,
Residential filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling by the district court that would allow
Residential to also litigate the validity of ParkWest's lien in the Property on at least six

additional grounds. R, Vol. 3, p. 467-68 n.1. The district court granted Residential's motion in
limine to allow the future litigation of yet additional challenges to the validity of ParkWest's lien
on a piecemeal basis, holding as follows:

10
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Consistent with this conclusion, this court grants
Residential's motion in limine regarding the "law of the case" to
the extent that ParkWest may only rely on the Barnson [IJ
appellate decision as the "law of the case" to the extent that the
Idaho Supreme Court ruled on the elements of lien validity
presented to it during that appeal and that all other aspects of lien
validity not raised before Judge Petrie or during the appeal of his
decision remain issues to be decided by this court.
R, Vol. 4, p. 496 (Decision I, at 16).
III.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Did the district court err in ruling the lis pendens and Bamson Judgment

that ParkWest recorded against the Property failed to provide Residential with constructive
notice of this civil action and ParkWest's lien in the Property?
B.

Did the district court err in ruling that the priority of Park West's claimed

mechanic's lien in the Property was lost when the Bamson Judgment became a final judgment
under Idaho law?
C.

Did the district court err in ruling the "law of the case" doctrine does not

preclude Residential from litigating additional challenges to the validity of ParkWest's lien in the
Property, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's opinion in Barnson I holding the lien to be valid?
D.

Did the district court err in ruling that the interest in the Property acquired

by Residential was held by the trustee under the MERS' Deed of Trust, rather than by Bamson as
the owner of the Property and trustor and MERS as the designated trust beneficiary?
IV.

ARGUMENT

ParkWest submits that determination ofthe first two issues stated above should
resolve not only this appeal but also this action. For if, as ParkWest contends, Residential had

11
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constructive notice of the Barnson Judgment when Residential purchased the Property and
ParkWest'sjudgment lien relates back to its claimed mechanic's lien, there should be little if
anything left to litigate. Because, however, Residential has confirmed that it intends litigating on
a piecemeal basis multiple additional challenges to ParkWest's lien in the Property - and the
district court has ruled Residential can do so - the resolution of the stated issue concerning the
law of the case is essential iflitigation over the validity of ParkWest's lien is to end without yet
additional appeals. The fourth issue stated above is presented as a protective measure, to ensure
review of the question in the event this court were to hold on appeal that ParkWest's claimed
mechanic's lien did not merge into the recorded Barnson Judgment.3
A.

Standard of Review.
Issues decided by summary judgment are subject to free review on appeal. Thus,

as summarized in National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho
537, 112 P.3d 825 (2005):
Summary judgment shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw.
LR.C.P.56(c). On review this Court construes the record in the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all
reasonable inferences and conclusions in that party's favor. Hardy
v. McGill, 137 Idaho 280,285,47 P.3d 1250, 1255 (2002). Where
there are no disputed issues of material fact, only a question oflaw
remains, and this Court exercises free review. Construction
3 As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the doctrine of relation back "by
process of judicial reasoning merges the attachment lien in the judgment and relates the
judgment lien back to the date of attachment ...." United States v. Sec. Trust & Sav. Bank of
San Diego, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
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Management Systems, Inc. v. Assurance Co. ofAmerica, 135 Idaho
680,682,23 P.3d 142, 144 (2001).
Nat'f Union Fire Ins. Co., 141 Idaho at 540, 112 P.3d at 828.

B.

The Recorded Lis Pendens and Barnson Judgment Provided Residential
With Constructive Notice of This Civil Action and ParkWest's Lien.
ParkWest first raised the issue of constructive notice in its opposition to

Residential's motion for summary judgment challenging the validity of Park West's claimed
mechanic's lien, with ParkWest relying on its two recorded lis pendens to establish that
Residential had constructive notice of this lawsuit and ParkWest's claimed lien. After the
district court ruled adversely to ParkWest on the issue,4 ParkWest raised the issue of the fact and
legal effect of the Barnson Judgment as the basis for its motions for reconsideration and to alter
or amend the Judgment, with ParkWest also relying on the recorded Barnson Judgment to
establish that Residential had constructive notice. Although the district court may not have
expressly ruled on the issue of whether the recorded Barnson Judgment provided Residential
with constructive notice of this lawsuit and ParkWest's lien, at a minimum the district court
implicitly ruled adversely to ParkWest. 5

Decision I, at 21 ("there would be no constructive or actual knowledge of the lien
imputed to a purchaser of the property who would be obtaining legal title to the property from
the trustee ... "). R, Vol. 4, p. 501.
4

5 Decision II, at 5 ("The court's consideration of Park West's pending motions is limited
to the narrow issue of the legal effect of recording the Barnson Judgment relative to prioritizing
the parties' respective interests in the property. The court is not otherwise revisiting its findings
of fact and legal conclusions as contained in its memorandum decision."). R, Vol. 4, p. 589.
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ParkWest's contention that the recorded Bamson Judgment provided Residential
with constructive notice of this action and ParkWest's lien is firmly grounded in Idaho's
recording statutes. Thus, Idaho Code Section 55-811 provides, in relevant part: "Every
conveyance of real property acknowledged or proved, and certified, and recorded as prescribed
by law, from the time it is filed with the recorder for record, is constructive notice of the contents
thereof to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees." (Emphasis added.) Further, Idaho Code

Section 55-813 defines "conveyance" as follows: "The term 'conveyance' as used in this
chapter, embraces every instrument in writing by which any estate or interest in real property is
created, alienated, mortgaged or encumbered, or by which the title to any real property may be
affected, except wills." (Emphasis added.) And Idaho Code Section 55-801 provides: "Any

instrument or judgment affecting the title to or possession of real property may be recorded
under this chapter." (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has held in interpreting the application of
Idaho's recording statutes:
It has long been established that a purchaser is charged with
every fact shown by the records and is presumed to know every
other fact which an examination suggested by the records would
have disclosed. Cordova v. Hood, 17 Wall. 1,84 U.S. 1,21 L.Ed.
587 (1873); Northwestern Bank v. Freeman, 171 U.S. 620, 19
S.Ct. 36,43 L.3d. 307 (1898).

Kalange v. Rencher, 136 Idaho 192, 195-96,30 P.3d 970,973-94 (2001). See also West Wood
Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 86, 106 P.3d 401, 412 (2005) (same), and Kaupp v. City of
Hailey, 110 Idaho 337, 340, 715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App. 1986) ("extemporaneous facts which
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are sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person upon an inquiry of a possible conflicting
interest, will be treated as providing constructive notice."). Residential clearly, therefore, had
constructive notice of this lawsuit and ParkWest's lien by application of Idaho's recording
statutes when Residential purchased the Property the year after the Bamson Judgment was
recorded. 6
The "lis pendens" doctrine is summarized in Sartain v. Fidelity Financial
Services, Inc., 116 Idaho 269, 775 P.2d 161 (Ct. App. 1989), as follows:
The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the common law
principle that when a third party - with actual or constructive
notice of a pending action involving real property acquires an
interest in that real property from a party to the action, then the
third party takes subject to the rights of the parties in the action as
finally determined by the judgment or decree. Idaho Code § 5-505
provides for the filing of a lis pendens which serves as constructive
notice under the doctrine. When a subsequent purchaser or
encumbrancer has actual knowledge of an action affecting its right
or interest in real property, a notice ollis pendens need not be
filed by the party advancing the claim. [7)

6 Both Bamson's and MERS' respective interests in the Property are also identified in
each of the following additional items recorded by the Canyon County Recorder relating to
Residential's acquisition: (i) the MERS' Deed of Trust, R, Vol. 3, pp. 367-68; (ii) the
Appointment of Successor Trustee, by which First American Title Insurance Company ("First
American") was named the successor trustee under the MERS' Deed of Trust, R, Vol. 3, p. 390;
and (iii) the Trustee's Deed from First American conveying the Property to Residential,
R, Vol. 3, p. 391.

7 As explained in Corpus Juris Secundum, the doctrine binds a purchaser of property to
all proceedings evolving from the litigation after the lis pendens is filed:

A properly filed lis pendens binds subsequent purchasers or
encumbrancers to all proceedings evolving from the litigation. Thus a
person whose conveyance is recorded after the filing of a notice of
pendency is bound by all proceedings taken in the action after such filing.
54 c.J.S. Lis Pendens § 46 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
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Sartain, 116 Idaho at 272, 775 P.2d at 164 (internal and concluding citations omitted; emphasis
added). Thus, because the filing of a lis pendens is a prophylactic measure for providing notice
to third-party purchasers and mortgagees, and not a requirement to perfect or maintain a lien or
other claim, the recorded Barnson Judgment was sufficient to provide Residential with
constructive notice of this civil action and ParkWest's lien in the Property irrespective of
ParkWest's two recorded lis pendens.
But the district court also erred in ruling that Residential was without constructive
notice by application of Idaho Code Section 5-505,8 because Residential acquired legal title to
the Property from the trustee under the MERS' Deed of Trust and the trustee was not named as a
party defendant in this lawsuit or identified in ParkWest's two lis pendens.
Although neither the conveying trustee, First American, nor its predecessor
trustee under the MERS' Deed of Trust was named in this action or identified in ParkWest's lis
pendens, both Barnson and MERS were. Accordingly, the question becomes whether
Residential acquired any of its interest in the Property through either Barnson or MERS. This
question is resolved by established Idaho precedent.
In Long v. Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 671 P.2d 1048 (1983) [hereinafter Long], the

Supreme Court held as follows:
8 Idaho Code Section 5-505 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
From the time of filing such notice for record only shall a
purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be
deemed to have constructive notice ofthe pendency ofthe action,
and only of its pendency against parties designated by their real
names.
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We hold that the deed of trust conveys to the trustee
nothing more than a power ofsale, capable of exercise upon the
occurrence of certain contingencies (such as default in payment)
and leaves in the trustor a legal estate comprised of all incidents of
ownership which passes to the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of
bankruptcy.

* *

*

Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage
with power of sale.
105 Idaho at 586 & 587-88, 671 P.2d at 1049 & 1050-51 (emphasis added). And as
subsequently explained in Willis v. Realty Country, Inc., 121 Idaho 312, 824 P.2d 887 (et. App.
1991) [hereinafter Willis]:
Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a mortgage with a power of
sale; the legal title is conveyed to the trustee solely for the purpose
of security. The deed of trust leaves in the grantor a legal estate
which entitles the grantor to possession of the property and all
incidents of ownership; the exception to this is the trustee's power
to sell the property in the event of the grantor's default on the
underlying obligation.
121 Idaho at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (citing Long) (emphasis added).9 Thus, because the only
interest held by the trustee under the MERS' Deed of Trust was legal title for purposes ofthe
power of sale, with all interests in the Property other than ParkWest's being held by Bamson and
MERS, Residential necessarily acquired its interest in the Property through the defendants
named in this action and identified in ParkWest's two recorded lis pendens.

9The opinions in Long and Willis are central to the final issue presented on appeal (i.e.,
whether the interest in the Property acquired by Residential was held by the conveying trustee,
rather than by Bamson and MERS) and are therefore further discussed in part IV.E, below.
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Accordingly, each of the three recorded documents here at issue was sufficient in
and of itself to provide Residential with constructive notice of this civil action and ParkWest's
lien in the Property, notwithstanding the district court's express and implicit rulings to the
contrary.
C.

The Priority of ParkWest's Lien Was Not Lost When the Barnson Judgment
Became a Final Judgment Under Idaho Law.
As argued by ParkWest in the proceedings below, and not in any manner rebutted

or even addressed by either Residential or the district court, the following facts and rule of civil
procedure establish that the Bamson Judgment became a final judgment under Idaho law on
January 26,2009 - a date six months prior to Residential's acquisition of the Property: (i) the
express terms of the Bamson Judgment ("This Judgment shall be considered to be a final
judgment against Bamson and is intended to constitute the final judgment against her in this
action."), R, FA, p. 108, ~ 4; (ii) MERS' Judgment entered on January 26,2009, which was
made with respect to all parties other than Bamson, R, FA, p. 134; and (iii) Rule 54(a), Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure ("A judgment is final if ... judgment has been entered on all claims for
relief, except costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action."). 10
Nor were any ofthe following additional facts and legal contentions argued by
ParkWest in the proceedings below contested by either Residential or the district court:

The Judgment on appeal also provides that the Bamson Judgment is a final judgment.
R, Vol. 4, p. 509, ~ 5.
10
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•

That ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien attached to the Property when

ParkWest commenced construction of Barnson's residence in May 2006, or six months before
the MERS' Deed of Trust was recorded. Terra-West, Inc. v. Idaho Mut. Trust, LLC, 150 Idaho
393,400,247 P.3d 620,627 (2010) [hereinafter Terra-West] (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the
time that work is commenced ... ").
•

That ParkWest's claim against Barnson merged into the Barnson

Judgment, and was thereby extinguished, when the Barnson Judgment became final in January
2009, or six months before Residential acquired the Property. II
•

That because the Barnson Judgment was recorded in October 2008,

ParkWest held a judgment lien in the Property when Residential purchased it in July 2009.
Idaho Code Section 10-111 0 (from the time a judgment is recorded by the county recorder, "the

II

The rule with respect to the merger of an inchoate claim into a final judgment is as

follows:
As a general rule, when a valid final judgment is rendered,
the original debt or cause of action, or underlying obligation upon
which an adjudication is predicated, merges into the judgment.
The original claim is extinguished and a new cause of action on a
judgment is substituted for it. ... [,J It is immaterial whether the
judgment is rendered upon a verdict; or upon a motion to dismiss
or other objection to the pleadings; or upon consent, confession, or
default.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 458 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added). Accord
Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 256, 668 P.2d 130, l32 (Ct. App. 1983) ("When the plaintiff
obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim 'merges' in the judgment .... ").
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judgment so recorded becomes a lien upon all real property ofthe judgment debtor in the county,
not exempt from execution ... ").
•

That both the fact and effect of the Barnson Judgment were put at issue in

this lawsuit by the allegations pleaded in ParkWest's Supplemental Complaint. See Statement of
Facts ~ 11, supra.
Thus, the essence of the dispute over whether Residential acquired the Property
free of the lien of the Bamson Judgment or subject to it can be distilled to the following question:
Is the priority of a mechanic's lien lost if a lien claimant reduces its claim to final judgment? 12
Although the district court implicitly held that it is lost, ParkWest submits that such a result is
contrary to both established law and good policy, based on the points and authorities discussed
below.

12 Some ofthe distinctions between judgment liens and mechanic's liens were recently
summarized by the Supreme Court of Connecticut:

A judgment lien is based on ajudicial determination of the amount
of the debt owed by the debtor to the creditor and can be
independently verified by checking judicial records. A mechanic's
lien, on the other hand, is based on a contractor's representation of
the amount owed and cannot be independently verified.
PNC Bank, NA. v. Kelepecz, 960 A.2d 563, 569 (Conn. 2008).
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1.

The district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a mechanic's
lien is lost by entry of final judgment is contrary to the established
rule of law in other jurisdictions.

Although ParkWest concurs with the district court's ruling that a "judgment lien
is created at the time the judgment is recorded,"13 the question of when a judgment lien is created
is distinct from the question of whether the priority of a judgment lien relates back to, and is
established by, the priority date of a judgment creditor's prior lien in real property. The
established law of our sister states with respect to the priority of judgment liens under such
circumstances is contrary to the district court's decision.
Thus, as explained in American Jurisprudence 2d:
A lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a
judgment generally is not affected by such merger. If a debt is of
such a character that a lien is given by common law or statute, the
merger of the judgment does not involve a merger of the lien and
the latter may continue until the debt is satisfied. An assignment
or lien securing a debt which becomes merged in a judgment is not
affected by the merger; the merger does not destroy the character
of the debt. If a creditor has a lien upon property of the debtor
and obtains a judgment against the debtor, the creditor does not
thereby lose the benefit of the lien. The judgment only changes the
form of the action for recovery. The creditor retains the right to
13

Decision II, at 6:
Thus, the Bamson Judgment became a judgment lien pursuant to
Idaho Code 10-1110 which states "from the time of such
recording, and not before, the judgment so recorded becomes a lien
upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county not
"exempt from execution .... " LC. 10-1110 (emphasis added).
The plain language ofthe statute states that the judgment lien is
created at the time the judgment is recorded.

R, Vol. 4, p. 590 (underscoring in original).
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enforce a lien or gain possession of property held as collateral for
the debt. The reason for this rule is to avoid the obvious injustice
offorcing the assignee or lien holder to lose its security preference
by pursuing its claim to judgment.
46 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 462 (2006) (multiple footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The
foregoing legal principles are supported by a multitude of authorities cited in the omitted
footnotes. See also BNC Mortg., Inc. v. Tax Pros, Inc., 46 P.3d 812,818 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002)
("In general, a judgment lien against real estate relates back to the date on which the real estate
was attached." (footnote with citations to multiple supporting authorities omitted));

JI Kislak Mortg. Corp. of Del. v. William Matthews Builder, Inc., 287 A.2d 686,688 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1972) ("The lien of judgment for a mechanic's lien relates back to the time that the
contractor commenced work or first supplied material."); and In re Rainbow Trust, Bus. Trust,
200 B.R. 785, 789 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1996) (under Vermont law, judgment lien obtained by
mechanic's lien claimant against Chapter 11 debtor relates back to date of writ of attachment),

afJ'd, 216 B.R. 77 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1997).
All of the foregoing authorities were cited by ParkWest in the proceedings below
and are in accordance with the following rule articulated in Restatement of the Law Second:

Incidents of claim preserved. When by reason of the
plaintiffs obtaining judgment upon a claim the original claim is
extinguished and rights arise upon the judgment, advantages to
which the plaintiff was entitled with respect to the original claim
may still be preserved despite the judgment. Thus if a creditor has
a lien upon property of the debtor and obtains a judgment against
him, the creditor does not thereby lose the benefit of the lien.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. g (1982) (emphasis added). Accord
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 47 cmt. d (1942).
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Conversely, neither Residential nor the district court cited a single judicial
opinion or secondary authority supporting the proposition that the priority of a lien in real
property is lost if a lien claimant reduces its claim to final judgment.

2.

The district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a mechanic's
lien is lost by entry of final judgment is contrary to established Idaho
legal principles.

Although no Idaho appellate opinion appears to address the question of whether
the priority of a judgment lien relates back to the priority date of the judgment creditor's prior
inchoate mechanic's lien, Idaho law supports ParkWest's position that it does.
The starting point for determining the extent of ParkWest's lien in the Property is
the Constitution of the State of Idaho, which provides, in relevant part: "The legislature shall
provide by proper legislation for giving to mechanic's, laborers, and materialmen an adequate
lien on the subject matter of their labor." IDAHO CONST. art. XIII, § 6 (emphasis added). The
question of whether the priority of ParkWest's lien in the Property was lost by entry of the
Bamson Judgment is thereby one of constitutional dimension.
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional mandate, Chapter 5, Title 45, Idaho
Code sets forth the statutory framework for liens of mechanics and materialmen. Included
among these statutory provisions are the following two:
•

Idaho Code Section 45-510 ("The lien of a final judgment obtained on any

lien provided for in this chapter shall cease five (5) years from the date the judgment becomes
final ... " (emphasis added)); and
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•

Idaho Code Section 45-506 ("The liens provided for in this chapter . .. are

preferred to any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance, which may have attached subsequent to
the time when the building, improvement or structure was commenced ... " (emphasis added)).
Thus, as the first ofthe two foregoing statutes establishes, a judgment lien such as
ParkWest's is provided for in Chapter 5, Title 45. And as the second ofthe two foregoing
statutes establishes, ParkWest's judgment lien is given statutory preference over the MERS'
Deed of Trust. Moreover, the Supreme Court has long "held that a mechanic's lien, 'if any exists
at all, relates back to the date of the commencement of the work or improvement or the
commencement to furnish thematerial.'" Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 400,247 P.3d at 627
(emphasis added) (quoting White v. Constitution Mining & Mill Co., 56 Idaho 403, 420,55 P.2d
152, 160 (1936)).
ParkWest therefore submits that there can be no conceivable justification for
affording its judgment lien in the Property a priority date other than the date it commenced
constructing the improvements to the Property.

3.

The district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a mechanic's
lien is lost by entry of final judgment creates uncertainty in the law
and would foster additional litigation.

Because ParkWest's claim against Barnson was merged into the Barnson
Judgment and thereby extinguished, ParkWest's ability to obtain the money it is owed is wholly
dependent on its ability to enforce its judgment lien in the Property. And because the MERS'
Deed of Trust was recorded after ParkWest commenced constructing the improvements to the
Property but before the Barnson Judgment was recorded, ParkWest's ability to enforce its lien is
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wholly dependent on whether the priority of Park West's judgment lien relates back to the
priority date of Park West's inchoate mechanic's lien. The unintended consequences arising out
of the district court's implicit ruling that the priority of a lien in real property is lost if a lien
claimant reduces its claim to final judgment are significant.
Thus, for example, if reducing a claim to final judgment results in the loss of a
lien claimant's priority, no such claimant

including mortgagees or others holding voluntary

liens - could settle a suit without losing the priority of the claimant's lien when junior liens have
also been recorded and remain unsatisfied. Or if a lien foreclosure suit involving multiple lien
claimants was prosecuted to judgment and anyone of the lien claimants appealed the judgment,
all other lien claimants would be compelled to appeal as well, in order to ensure that their own
judgments did not become final with a resulting loss of their respective lien priorities. Or if in
the prior hypothetical appeal the judgments for some of the appealing lien claimants were
affirmed and the judgments for others were remanded, the lien claimants whose judgments were
affirmed might lose the priority of their respective liens merely as a result of their judgments
being affirmed. Other equally unjust results of the district court's implicit ruling are inevitable.
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, this court should rule that the
priority of a recorded judgment lien held by a mechanic's lien claimant relates back to, and is
established by, the priority date of the claimed mechanic's lien.
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D.

The "Law of the Case" Doctrine Precludes Residential From Litigating
Additional Challenges to the Validity of ParkWest's Lien.
As quoted in the introduction to this brief, the Supreme Court held in Barnson I

that ParkWest's "lien was valid for labor and materials supplied after the contractor registered."
149 Idaho at 604,238 P.3d at 204. Nevertheless, the district court ruled based on the following
stated grounds that the opinion in Barnson I did not foreclose additional challenges to the
validity of Park West's lien in the Property:
However, nowhere in that appellate decision does the Idaho
Supreme Court indicate that ParkWest's lien is valid and
enforceable and not challengeable as to all the other lien
requirements found in Idaho Code 45-501 et seq nor did the Idaho
Supreme Court indicate that on remand that the district court
would be foreclosed from considering other aspects of the lien's
validity not specifically addressed by the Court in its appellate
decision.
R, Vol. 4, p. 495 (Decision I, at 15).
Although the district court cites no authority for the proposition that the law ofthe
case only applies if an appellate court provides a trial court with written direction not to consider
alternative challenges, the district court's ruling is generally consistent with the law followed in
the federal courts and some state courts, but contrary to the law of Idaho. Thus, as explained in
American Jurisprudence 2d:
In the federal courts, the law of the case doctrine applies
only to issues that were decided in the former proceeding, whether
explicitly or by necessary implication, but not to questions which
might have been decided but were not. While some state appellate
courts follow this rule, holding that the law of the case is restricted
to questions presented to and decided by the appellate court at the
former hearing in the case and those questions necessarily involved
in the decision, and that issues not conclusively decided in the
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prior appeal do not become the law of the case, other courts hold
that the former adjudication is the law of the case as to all
questions directly raised and passed upon and all matters which
arose prior to the first appeal and which might have been raised
thereon but were not. [14]
5 AM.

JUR.

2D Appellate Review § 569 (2007) (multiple footnotes omitted).
The application of the "law of the case" doctrine under Idaho law is explained in

Hawley v. Green, 124 Idaho 385, 860 P.2d 1 (Ct. App. 1993):
In Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395
(CLApp. 1990) (Capps 11), we dealt with a similar timeliness issue.
In that quiet title case, the Capps failed to raise the issue of an
alleged settlement agreement initially and in the first appeal, Capps
v. Wood, 110 Idaho 778, 718 P.2d 1216 (1986) (Capps 1). The
Capps raised the issue before the district court on remand from the
Supreme Court's reversal of summary judgment for the defendants
in Capps 1. In Capps II, we held that the settlement agreement
issue was not viable because "under the 'law of the case' principle,
on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not
consider errors which arose prior to the first appeal and which
might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal." Capps II,
117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399; see also Red Bluff Mines, Inc. v.
Indus. Com 'n of Ariz., 144 Ariz. 199,696 P.2d 1348, 1353
(CLApp. 1984) (question that could have been raised on earlier
appeal in workers' compensation case but was not, cannot be
considered on second appeal). Hawley has not shown why the
equitable estoppel issue was not raised in the district court prior to
Hawley I, or stated differently, she has not pointed to any new or
additional fact or circumstance arising after the remand order
which gave rise to the estoppel issue. Because the estoppel
argument was clearly available to Hawley prior to Hawley I, we
will not address the issue.
Citing Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 614, 790 P.2d 395 (Ct. App. 1990), for the legal
principle: "Courts generally will not consider error which arose prior to the first appeal and
which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal." As the opinion in Capps explains:
"This approach discourages piecemeal appeals and is consistent with the broad scope of claim
preclusion under the analogous doctrine of res judicata." 117 Idaho at 618, 790 P.2d at 399.
14
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Hawley, 124 Idaho at 392, 860 P.2d at 8. The Supreme Court adopted the foregoing rule in
Bouten Construction Co. v. HF. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 (1999).
In Bouten, the plaintiff successfully appealed the judgment entered following a

court trial. 133 Idaho at 759,992 P.2d at 754. Following the remand, the district court awarded
the plaintiff additional damages based on the evidence presented at the earlier trial. 133 Idaho
at 760,992 P.2d at 755. The defendant (and respondent in the first appeal) then appealed,
arguing an issue not raised by it in the earlier appeal. 133 Idaho at 762,992 P.2d at 757. The
Supreme Court refused to consider the issue on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals has ruled that "under the 'law of the
case' principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts
generally will not consider errors which arose prior to the first
appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier
appeal." Therefore, since the issue was not raised at the trial court
level nor to the Court of Appeals on the first appeal, it will not be
considered by this Court.
Ibid (internal and concluding citations omitted).
For the reasons previously discussed establishing that Residential had
constructive notice of this civil action and ParkWest's lien, Residential is bound by the decision
in Barnson I. See, e.g., note 7, supra. And because Residential has failed to identify any reason
that its challenge to ParkWest's lien discussed in the next section of this brief could not have
been raised by MERS in its own earlier challenge to the lien, consideration of Residential's
challenge by the district court or in this appeal is precluded by the law of the case. The district
court's ruling that Residential can litigate yet additional challenges to the validity of ParkWest's
lien on a piecemeal basis after this appeal is decided is, for the same reasons, equally contrary to
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established Idaho law, absent a showing that a new challenge could not have been earlier
litigated.

E.

The Interest in the Property Conveyed by the Trustee's Deed Was Held by
Barnson as the Owner and Trustor and MERS as the Designated Trust
Beneficiary, Not by First American as the Trustee.
The district court ruled that Residential acquired the Property free of ParkWest's

claimed mechanic's lien on the following grounds:
First American was the trustee pursuant to the MERS
Deeds of Trust at the time the Verified Complaint was filed in this
case. Residential argues that First American was a necessary party
to this action because it was the Trustee of the Deed of Trust.
Idaho Code 45-1502 defines "trustee" as a person to whom legal
title is conveyed by trust deed, and "trustee [sic] deed" is a deed
conveying real property to a trustee. A deed of trust is a
conveyance of real property, and legal title to the property is
conveyed by the deed of trust to the trustee. See I.C. 45-1513 and
Defendant A v. Idaho State Bar, 132 Idaho 662, 978 P.2d 222
(1999). Thus, Residential argues that the trustee is a necessary
party because it is the party holding legal title to the property. This
argument is supported by 52 [sic] Am. JUL 2d Mechanics Lien 369
(2010) which states:
In a jurisdictions [sic] in which a deed of trust or
mortgage is effective as a transfer of legal title to
the secured party, the trustee of a deed of trust
recorded before attachment of a mechanic's lien is
a necessary party to a suit to enforce the
mechanic's lien; if the trustee is not a party to the
enforcement suit, the mechanic's lien cannot be
enforced. Thus, the court in such a case must have
jurisdiction over the person of the trustee before the
court can divest the trustee of title. The beneficiary
of a deed of trust that is inferior to the mechanic's
lien is also a necessary party in a title-theory
jurisdiction, since such a beneficiary holds an
interest that may be defeated or diminished if the
mechanic's lien is enforced.
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52 [sic] Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics Liens 369 (2010).
This court agrees with Residential [sic] assertion that First
American, as the designated successor trustee was a necessary
party to this action because First American, as the trustee, held the
power of sale and the power to convey legal title in the property.
Park West's [sic] failed to name First American as a party
defendant in this action or otherwise proceed against the trustee in
its action and thus, ParkWest's lien is not valid as to First
American pursuant to I.C. 45-51 O[Js] and the authority cited above.
Thus, when First American conveyed title to Residential via the
Trustee's Deed, Residential took title to the property free of the
lien's encumbrance.
R, Vol. 4, pp. 498-99 (Decision I, at 18-19) (emphasis added).
As an initial matter, ParkWest acknowledges that its mechanic's lien was lost
with respect to First American's interest in the Property. See, e.g., Bonner Bldg. Supply, Inc. v.
Standard Forest Prods., Inc., 106 Idaho 682, 686, 682 P.2d 635,639 [hereinafter Bonner] (Ct.
App. 1984) (plaintiffs failure to name defendant Standard as a defendant "left Standard's
interest in the property unaffected by the foreclosure."). However, to say ParkWest's lien was
lost to First American's interest in the Property is but the beginning of the inquiry, as (i) the
precise interest in the Property First American held must then be determined, as well as (ii) the
precise interest in the Property conveyed to Residential by the Trustee's Deed. These two
corollary issues are discussed in tum.

Idaho Code Section 45-510 provides, in relevant part: "No lien provided for in this
chapter binds any building, mining claim, improvement or structure for a longer period than six
(6) months after a claim has been filed, unless proceedings be commenced in a proper court
within that time to enforce such lien .... "
IS
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1.

First American's interest in the Property was limited to legal title for
purposes of the power of sale, with aU interests in the Property other
than ParkWest's being held by Barnson and MERS.

As discussed in part IV.B, above, the Supreme Court's holding in Long and the
Court of Appeals' summation of Idaho law in Willis establish the extremely limited extent of the
interest in the Property that First American held.
In Long, Defendant Williams granted a deed of trust on land he owned to secure
payment under a promissory note to A vco, designating Lewis County Abstract Company as the
trustee. 105 Idaho at 586, 671 P.2d at 1049. A little more than a year after the deed of trust was
recorded, Williams filed bankruptcy, resulting in his interest in the property passing to the
bankruptcy estate. Id. The bankruptcy trustee then sold to Avco all of the bankruptcy estate's
interest in the property, following which Avco caused Lewis County Abstract Company to
reconvey its interest in the property to Williams. Jd. A few months later, Plaintiff Long acquired
Avco's interest in the property by quitclaim deed and then filed suit to evict Williams from the
property. Id.
In response to Long's suit, Williams contended that he remained the owner of the
property, arguing that Lewis County Abstract Company had legal title to the property by virtue
of the deed of trust at the time Williams filed bankruptcy, that therefore the bankruptcy trustee
could not convey legal title to Avco, and that the deed of reconveyance by Lewis County
Abstract Company effected the conveyance of all equitable and legal interests in the property
back to Williams. 105 Idaho at 587, 671 P.2d at 1050. Thus, just as in the present dispute, the
issue in Long was "whether a deed of trust conveys all legal title to the trustee, or whether the
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passage of title to the trustee is, for practical purposes, in the nature of a mortgage with a power
of sale." Id.
The Supreme Court determined that Long, and not Williams (as the grantee under
the deed of reconveyance), was the owner of the property:
Therefore, we hold that, even though title passes for the purpose of
the trust, a deed of trust is for practical purposes only a mortgage
with power of sale.

At the time Williams filed his petition in bankruptcy, he
had a legal interest in the property which was good against all
persons except the Lewis County Abstract Company, which held
nothing more than the power of sale upon the happening of certain
contingencies. Williams' interest (comprised of all other attributes
of ownership) passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Section 541 of
Title 11 U.S.C. provides:
"Property of the estate. (a) The commencement of a case
under section 301,302, or 303 of this title creates an estate.
Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located: (l) ... all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case."
The trustee in bankruptcy conveyed all legal and equitable
interests of Williams in the subject property to Avco. Avco's
interest as beneficiary under the Deed of Trust merged with this
purchased interest. Thus, Avco was the owner of the property and
entitled to possession subject only to the satisfaction of the
homestead interest of Williams and to Long's inferior judgment
lien. Consequently, when Lewis County Abstract executed the
Deed of Reconveyance, it conveyed no interest.[16]

16 Obviously if a trustee under a deed of trust holds more than legal title for purposes of
the power of sale, as Residential contends in this lawsuit, Lewis County Abstract Company's
interest in the property could not have been conveyed by the trustee in William's bankruptcy and
Lewis County Abstract Company's subsequent deed of reconveyance would have conveyed such
property interest back to Williams, just as he argued in Long.
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105 Idaho at 587-88,671 P.2d at 1050-51 (ellipsis in original; emphasis added).
The district court sought to distinguish the opinion in Long by limiting its holding
to the effect of the Williams' bankruptcy.17 However, not only did the Supreme Court not so
limit the holding in its opinion in Long nor has either of Idaho's appellate courts issued an
opinion that in any manner supports the district court's ruling, but the Court of Appeals'
summation ofIdaho law in Willis, as further discussed below, is contrary to the district court's
mling. Accordingly, as established by Long and Willis, First American's interest in the Property
was limited to legal title for purposes of the power of sale under the MERS' Deed of Trust, with
all interests in the Property other than ParkWest's being held by Bamson as the owner and
tmstor and MERS as the designated trust beneficiary - who were both timely named as
defendants in this lawsuit.

2.

Because MERS' Deed of Trust was executed by Barnson after
ParkWest's lien had attached, the interest in the Property conveyed
by the Trustee's Deed was encumbered by ParkWest's lien.

The statutory starting point for determining Residential's interest in the Property
is Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10):
The trustee's deed shall convey to the purchaser the interest
in the property which the grantor had, or had the power to convey,
at the time of the execution by him of the trust deed together with
any interest the grantor or his successors in interest acquired after
the execution of such trust deed.
17 Decision II, at 11 ("The court does not find that the facts of Long are commensurate
with the facts of this case. The Long decision is based on the unique nature of the transaction
involved and effect ofthe bankruptcy statutes on the respective interests of the parties in that
case."). R, VoL 4, p. 595. No analysis or authority was provided by the district court to support
its ruling.
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(Emphasis added.) Thus, because ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien attached to the Property
when ParkWest commenced construction of Barns on's residence six months before the MERS'
Deed of Trust was executed and recorded, 18 Barnson's interest in the Property was encumbered
by ParkWest's lien "at the time of the execution by [Barnson] of the trust deed ... ," id.; and
therefore the Trustee's Deed could convey to Residential no more than Bamson's encumbered
interest in the Property. The district court's ruling avoids this result by holding that First
American was a necessary party to this action. The district court erred in its ruling for the
following three reasons.
First, the quoted summary of the law from American Jurisprudence 2d relied
upon by the district court to support its ruling pertains to "the trustee of a deed of trust recorded

before attachment of a mechanic's lien . ... " 53 AM.

JUR.

2D Mechanics' Liens 369 (2011)

(emphasis added). In the present dispute, conversely, MERS' Deed of Trust was recorded after
ParkWest's claimed mechanic's lien had attached, not before.
Second, as explained by the Court of Appeals in Willis, Idaho does not adhere to
the common law followed in some states:

Under the rule at common law, a deed of trust places legal title to
the property in the trustee. Under Idaho law, a deed of trust is a
mortgage with a power of sale; the legal title is conveyed to the
trustee solely for the purpose of security. The deed oftrust leaves

See Terra-West, 150 Idaho at 400,247 P.3d at 627 (a mechanic's "lien attaches at the
time that work is commenced ... "). The district court's unsupported ruling that, "when Barnson
executed the Deed of Trust and it was recorded, the Deed of Trust became the first encumbrance
on the property[,]" R, Vol. 4, p. 597 (Decision II, at 13), is contrary to Terra-West and the earlier
Supreme Court precedent therein discussed.
18

34

Client:2094578.1

in the grantor a legal estate which entitles the grantor to possession
of the property and all incidents of ownership; the exception to this
is the trustee's power to sell the property in the event of the
grantor's default on the underlying obligation. See Long v.
Williams, 105 Idaho 585, 587, 671 P.2d 1048, 1050 (1983); I.C.
§ 45-1506.
Willis, 121 Idaho at 314 n.2, 824 P.2d at 889 (internal citations omitted; emphasis added).
Third, as held by the Court of Appeals in Bonner: "no statute mandates the
joinder of specific parties to a lien foreclosure action. In fact, I.e. § 45-1302 indicates to the
contrary."19 106 Idaho at 685, 682 P.2d at 638. Indeed, Residential conceded in its briefing to
the district court that, "[u]nder the rule articulated in Bonner . .. and elsewhere, ParkWest was
not strictly required to name First American or Residential as Defendants in this action, but the
failure to do so left First American's interest in the Property unaffected by ParkWest's
foreclosure action." R, Vol. 3, p. 360. And on this point ParkWest has always concurred with
Residential. R, Vol. 3, p. 436.

19 Idaho Code Section 45-1302 was amended last year to provide as follows:
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon
real property or a lien on or security interest in personal property,
the plaintiff, cross-complainant or plaintiff in intervention may
make as party defendant in the same cause of action, any person
having, claiming, or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate,
or interest in or to any part of the real or personal property
involved therein, and the court shall, in addition to granting relief
in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or interest of all
parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and
effect as in the action to quiet title.
(Emphasis added.) The recent amendment did not alter the permissive character of the statute, as
held in Bonner.
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Accordingly, (i) because for the reasons discussed in part IV.B, above,
Residential had constructive notice when it acquired the Property of this civil action and
ParkWest's lien, and (ii) because the opinions in Long and Willis establish that First American's
interest in the Property was limited to legal title for purposes of the power of sale, and
(iii) because Idaho Code Section 45-1506(10) establishes that the Trust Deed could convey to
Residential no more than Barnson's encumbered interest in the Property, and (iv) because First
American was not a necessary party under Idaho law, Residential acquired the Property
encumbered by ParkWest's lien.

v.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing points and authorities, the Judgment in favor of
Residential should be vacated and the matter again remanded to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 14th day of November 2011.
MOFFA IT, THOMAS, BARREIT, ROCK &
FIELDS, CHARTERED

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
ParkWest Homes LLC
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